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The Compensation of Erroneously Convicted
Individuals in Pennsylvania
To deprive a man of liberty, put him to
heavy expense in defending himself,
and to cut off his power to earn a liv-
ing - these are sacrifices which the
state imposes on him for the public
purpose of punishing crime . . . and
when it is found that he incurred these
sacrifices through no fault of his own,
that he was innocent, then should not
the state at least compensate him, so
far as money can do so?'
I. INTRODUCTION
Since 1989, fourteen individuals have been exonerated in the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.! Due to no fault of their own,
they were subjected to the most intolerable living conditions,
forced to relinquish family relations, compelled to surrender their
sense of society, and required to expend large sums of money to
defend against crimes they did not commit. Currently, such indi-
viduals are offered only their freedom as remuneration and are
forced to readjust to an ever changing society without counseling,
assistance, or financial compensation. Unfortunately, the only
hope for redress continues to lie in the compassionate hearts of a
conservative legislature, as substantial barriers prevent the pay-
ment of damages for these egregious wrongs. The purpose of this
comment is to provide a background of the history of compensation
1. John H. Wigmore, Introduction to Edwin Borchard, State Indemnity for Errors of
Criminal Justice, 21 B.U. L. REV. 201, 201 (1941).
2. Samual R. Gross, et al., Exonerations in the United States 1989-2003 (2004), at
http://www.internationaljusticeproject.org/pdfs/ExonerationReport 4 .19.04.pdf. These indi-
viduals are: (1) Matthew Connor - 1990; (2) Bruce Nelson - 1991; (3) Jerry Packet - 1991;
(4) Jay C. Smith - 1992; (5) Dale Brison - 1994; (6) Vincent Moto - 1996; (7) Edward Ryder
- 1996; (8) Willie Nesmith - 2000; (9) William Nieves - 2000; (10) Edward Baker - 2002;
(11) Steven Crawford - 2002; (12) Bruce Godschalk - 2002; (13) Thomas Kimbell, Jr. -
2002; and (14) Nicholas Yarris - 2003. Id. at 31.
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for erroneously convicted individuals, as well as to outline reme-
dies currently available in Pennsylvania.
II. BACKGROUND
Evidence indicates that the movement for governmental com-
pensation of wrongfully imprisoned individuals began to take
shape in late eighteenth century France.3 Interestingly, by the
end of the nineteenth century at least ten countries had enacted
legislation to deal with this particular predicament.4 It was not
until 1938 that the United States government recognized an ac-
tion for damages for unjust conviction and imprisonment,5 and it
was not until 1941 that the first state enacted legislation to enable
wrongfully incarcerated individuals to bring such claims.6 To
date, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has not successfully
passed any such enabling statute.7
3. Edwin Borchard, European Systems of State Indemnity for Errors of Criminal Jus-
tice, 3 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 684, 689 (May 1912 - March 1913) [hereinafter
"Borchard, European Systems"]. The first actual expression of legislative intent to compen-
sate erroneously convicted individuals appears in a Prussian decree, dated 1766:
If a person suspected of crime has been detained for trial, and where, for lack of
proof, he has been released from custody, and in the course of time his complete inno-
cence is established, he shall have not only complete costs restored to him, but also a
sum of money as just indemnity, according to all the circumstances of the case, pay-
able from the funds of the trial court, so that the innocent person may be compen-
sated for the injuries he has suffered.
Id. at 689 (citing Neue Verordnung umn die Prozesse zu kuirzen, § 9, cited from Berolz-
heimer's Die Entschadigung unschuldig Verurteilter und Verhafteter, 1891, p. 7).
4. Borchard, European Systems, supra note 3, app. at 706-18. These countries and the
applicable laws are: (1) Spain - Penal Code of 1822, Articles 179-181; (2) Mexico - Penal
Code of Dec. 7, 1871, Articles 344, 345, and 348; (3) Portugal - Penal Code of June 14, 1884,
Art. 126, §§ 6 - 7; (4) Sweden - Law of Mar. 12, 1886; (5) Norway - the law of criminal pro-
cedure of July 1, 1887; (6) Denmark - Law of April 5, 1888; (7) Austria - Law of Mar. 16,
1892, Number 64; (8) France - Law of June 8, 1895, Bulletin No. 1706; (9) Hungary - Code
of Criminal Procedure, Dec. 4, 1896; and (10) Germany - Law of May 20, 1898. Id.
5. 18 U.S.C. § 729 (1938); currently 28 U.S.C. § 1495 (2004).
6. California was the first state to enact such legislation. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§
4900-4906. As will be discussed in more detail, infra notes 48-134 and accompanying text,
the following states and districts have enacted legislation to compensate individuals who
have been wrongfully convicted: (1) Alabama, (2) California, (3) Illinois, (4) Maine, (5)
Maryland, (6) New Hampshire, (7) New Jersey, (8) New York, (9) North Carolina, (10)
Iowa, (11) Ohio, (12) Tennessee, (13) Texas, (14) West Virginia, (15) Wisconsin, and (16) the
District of Columbia.
7. As will be discussed in more detail, infra notes 210-214 and accompanying text,
various bills have been proposed by the state legislature to provide a scheme for compensa-
tion to erroneously incarcerated individuals; however, all of these bills have died in com-
mittee. See H.B. 1281 P.N. 1591 (Pa. 2003)(not enacted); H.B. 2413 P.N. 3439 (Pa.
1984)(not enacted); S.B. 267 P.N. 269 (Pa. 1977)(not enacted); S.B. 93 P.N. 93 (Pa.
1977Xnot enacted); S.B. 1712 P.N. 2214 (Pa. 1976)(not enacted); S.B. 1361 P.N. 1657 (Pa.
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Before delving into a discussion about the appropriate actions
taken to seek redress in Pennsylvania, it is necessary to give a
general overview of the topic of compensation for erroneously con-
victed individuals. Therefore, this section is broken down into the
following subsections: (A) a brief overview of the theories underly-
ing compensation; and (B) an overview of the three schemes
through which a wrongfully convicted individual may seek re-
dress.
A. Theories
Two main theories have emerged to justify the notion of com-
pensation for erroneously imprisoned individuals, namely: (1) a
theory following the rationale of "eminent domain," and (2) a the-
ory following the rationale of "strict liability."8 The underlying
basis for both of these theories is that "erroneous confinements are
costs of operation to be borne by the system,"9 since "the prosecu-
tion of a crime [becomes] the function of the state alone.""
The so-called "eminent domain"" theory proposes that "the tak-
ing of an individual's freedom for the preservation of peace" 2 is
analogous to "the taking of property for public use."" Specifically,
the argument stems from the notion that private liberty is a right
as sacred as property, and any governmental taking of such right
should be compensated as a special damage. 4 To illustrate this
notion, Professor Borchard gave the following example:
1976)(not enacted); S.B. 3 P.N. 3 (Pa. 1973)(not enacted); H.B. 529 P.N. 592 (Pa. 1973)(not
enacted); and S.B. 1721 P.N. 2197 (Pa. 1972)(not enacted).
8. Edwin Borchard, State Indemnity for Errors of Criminal Justice, 21 B.U. L. Rev.
201, 207-08 (1941) [hereinafter Borchard, State Indemnity]; see also Joseph H. King, Jr.,
Comment, Compensation of Persons Erroneously Confined by the State, 118 PA. L. REV.
1091, 1092-93 n.14 (1969-1970).
9. King, supra note 8, at 1092.
10. Borchard, European Systems, supra note 3, at 688.
11. King, supra note 8, at 1092. King was the first to label this rationale as the "emi-
nent domain" theory. Id. However, the foundation for such an argument was set by Bor-
chard as early as 1912. See Borchard, European Systems, supra note 2, at 685. The term
"eminent domain" was used to "[connote] a constitutional mandate to compensate." King,
supra note 8, at 1093 n.15. However, it is arguable whether or not Borchard used his ra-
tionale as persuasive theory to influence the legislature of the United States, or in its strict
constitutional sense. Id. at 1092 n.14. According to King, Borchard's argument was purely
persuasive, as many problems arise from a constitutional argument, such as the restrictive
definition of the term "property." Id. at 1093 n. 15.
12. King, supra note 8, at 1092 n.14.
13. Id.
14. Borchard, European Systems, supra note 3, at 685; see also Borchard, State Indem-
nity, supra note 8, at 207.
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When we ask a citizen to become a juryman or a witness,
when his diseased animal is killed for fear of contagion, when
his house is destroyed to prevent the spread of conflagration,
when his property is taken by eminent domain for public use,
compensation is made for the special sacrifices he makes for
the general benefit of society. 5
The "strict liability" or "social welfare" theory equates society to
an entity comprised of many individuals that share a mutual in-
terest in reaching a common end. 16 Particularly, this theory
stresses that in reaching this end there are bound to be mistakes
and that it is unfair to place the burden of loss on a single individ-
ual injured during this process. 7 This theory is analogous to the
notion of workers' compensation, and follows the rationale that:
[11n the operation of any great undertaking, such as the man-
agement of a large industry or the administration of the
criminal law, there are bound to be a number of accidents...
[and] it is unfair to the individuals injured that they alone
should bear the entire loss resulting from the accident, and
therefore society distributes the loss among its members. 8
In other words, since society in general is deriving a benefit
from the administration of justice, and since there are bound to be
mistakes in any such undertaking, society should "share the loss
incurred by the victim of that error."9
While there are many arguments to counter these assertions,"
the above-mentioned theories set the foundation for redress and
give a rational basis on which reform should lie.
15. Borchard, European Systems, supra note 3, at 695.
16. Borchard, State Indemnity, supra note 8, at 208. Specifically, Borchard states:
Where the common interest is joined for a common end - maintaining the public
peace by the prosecution of crime - each individual member being subject to the same
danger (erroneous conviction), the loss when it occurs should be borne by the commu-




19. King, supra note 8, at 1093 n.14.
20. Borchard, European Systems, supra note 3, at 694. Three arguments against com-
pensation for erroneous governmental conviction are: (1) in administering justice, the state
acts in its sovereign capacity and cannot be held accountable in law for burdens individuals
may be forced to bear; (2) acting legally, the state cannot injure anyone; and (3) there can
be no liability without fault. Id. at 694-96.
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B. Three Schemes for Redress
As aforementioned, there are three general schemes through
which an erroneously convicted individual may seek redress,
namely: (1) fault-based governmental tort liability, (2) private
bills passed by the legislature, and (3) strict governmental liability
in the form of enabling statutes.21 The following is an overview of
each of these methods, as well as an outline of potential pitfalls.
1. Fault Based Governmental Tort Liability
Litigation based on governmental tort liability has only been
successful in a limited handful of situations. Potential suits have
been based on a multitude of theories, including (1) suits based on
a theory of malicious prosecution against either (a) the state, or (b)
an official of the state; and (2) suits based on a theory of false im-
prisonment against either (a) the state, or (b) an official of the
state.2  However, the concept of governmental immunity combined
with the burdens placed upon litigants in these situations creates
an almost impenetrable barrier for any possibility of success.2"
a. Burdens Placed Upon the Litigants
The burdens placed upon a wrongfully imprisoned individual
are not limited to the courtroom. After release from confinement,
"a potential wrongful imprisonment plaintiff often has no place to
live, let alone any money to give a lawyer [for] a retainer or to pay
the out-of-pocket expenses to develop a lawsuit."24 Frequently, due
to the ever-ticking clock behind the statute of limitations, much
valuable time to file a civil lawsuit for compensation is lost in or-
der for this individual to find a place to live and work. These
hardships, combined with the burden of proof placed on the liti-
gant, greatly reduce any chance of success in obtaining compensa-
tion for their erroneous imprisonment.
As mentioned above, two common forms of tort-based action
pursued to seek compensation for wrongful imprisonment are
21. King, supra note 8, 1098-1111; see also Adele Bernhard, When Justice Fails: In-
demnification for Unjust Conviction, 6 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 73, 86-111 (1999).
22. Bernhard, supra note 21, at 86.
23. Id.
24. Peter M. King and William H. Jones, Crimes of the State: Obtaining Justice for the
Wrongfully Imprisoned Individual, 29 Litigation 14, 14 (2002).
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based on the theories of malicious prosecution and false impris-
onment. This discussion will be limited to these causes of action.
The tort action of malicious prosecution "protects the personal
interest of freedom from unjustifiable litigation." 5 Specifically,
"the essence [of this tort] is the perversion of proper legal proce-
dures."26 To successfully bring suit on this theory, a litigant must
generally prove the following elements: (1) the defendant either
(a) initiated, or (b) procured the initiation of criminal proceedings
against him; (2) he is not guilty of the offense with which he was
charged; (3) the defendant either (a) initiated, or (b) procured the
proceedings without probable cause; and (4) the proceedings have
terminated in his favor.27 The two most problematic elements to
prove are: (1) a lack of probable cause, and (2) that the proceed-
28ings were initiated for an improper purpose.
According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, a lack of prob-
able cause will not be found if the individual who continued or ini-
tiated the proceeding either correctly believed or reasonably be-
lieved all of the following:
(a) that the person whom he accuses has acted or failed to act
in a particular manner; and
(b) that those acts or omissions constitute the offense that he
charges against the accused; and
(c) that he is sufficiently informed as to the law and the facts
to justify him in initiating or continuing the prosecution.
Additionally, under the Restatement, unless the wrongfully im-
prisoned individual can establish that the initial conviction was
obtained by either (1) fraud, (2) perjury, or (3) other corrupt
means, the conviction will be taken as conclusive evidence of prob-
able cause."
In order to establish improper purpose under the Restatement,
a litigant must be able to illustrate that prosecution was initiated
"for a purpose other than that of bringing an offender to justice."31
25. Broughton v. State, 335 N.E. 2d 310, 314 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975).
26. Broughton, 335 N.E. 2d at 14.
27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 653 (1977).
28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 653 cmt. b (1977).
29. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 662 (1977).
30. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 667 (1977).
31. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 668 (1977).
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In terms of a criminal prosecution, the principal situations in
which an improper purpose have been found are as follows:
(1) when the accuser does not believe in the guilt of the ac-
cused, (2) when the proceedings are initiated primarily be-
cause of hostility or ill will towards the accused, (3) when the
proceedings are initiated for the purpose of obtaining a pri-
vate advantage even though the advantage might legitimately
have been obtained in civil proceedings.32
Specifically, it has been stated that "[i]f the person initiating
criminal proceedings does not himself believe in the guilt of the
accused, it is plain that he cannot have a proper purpose."33
Liability for "false imprisonment" has been found to exist
"[w]henever a person unlawfully obstructs or deprives another of
his freedom to choose his own location."4 To successfully bring
suit on a theory of false imprisonment, a litigant must generally
prove the following elements: "(1) the defendant intended to con-
fine him, (2) [he or she] was conscious of the confinement, (3) [he
or she] did not consent to the confinement, and (4) the confine-
ment was not otherwise privileged."35 Unfortunately, unlawful
detention only gives rise to a cause of action for false imprison-
ment when the confinement was obtained through an arrest not
conducted "under a valid process issued by a court having jurisdic-
tion." 6 Therefore, "[wihen an unlawful arrest has been effected by




Sovereign immunity is the hardest obstacle that a wrongfully
incarcerated individual must overcome in terms of tort-based liti-
gation. The concept of sovereign immunity is solidified in the
Eleventh Amendment,38 and has been interpreted to bar suits
32. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 668 cmt. d (1977) (internal references omitted).
33. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 668 cmt. e (1977).
34. Broughton, 335 N.E. 2d at 314.
35. Broughton, 335 N.E. 2d at 314 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 35); see also
Bernhard, supra note 21, at 86.
36. Broughton, 335 N.E. 2d at 314.
37. Id.
38. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be con-
strued to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
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brought by a citizen in federal court against (1) his or her own
state,39 and (2) state officials acting within the scope of their au-
thority.4" Suits against a state or its officials are generally barred
in state courts due to a lack of jurisdiction being conferred to the
judiciary over such suits.4 In the absence of an express waiver in
the form of a legislative act, aspirations of recovery on the basis of
tort-liability are basically fruitless.42
2. Private Bills
A private bill, or moral obligation bill, is a "specifically drafted
[act] generally used to pay otherwise unenforceable claims on be-
half of individuals harmed by the state."43 Although such legisla-
tion "[lacks] any foundation cognizable in law," 4 the justification
for it "springs from a sense of justice and equity, that an honorable
person would entertain, but not from a mere sense of doing be-
nevolence or charity."5
While private bills offer a wrongfully incarcerated individual an
opportunity to receive compensation, they are a very problematic
form of redress. Not only are they forbidden in certain states, but
their success "depends more on the political connections of the
person introducing the bill and the political climate of the day
than on the merits of the case." 46 Additionally, "the process can be
lengthy and the outcome is always uncertain. "
3. Enabling Statutes
Currently, fifteen states, 8 the District of Columbia, and the
Federal Government have enacted legislation to compensate indi-
viduals wrongfully incarcerated. While each of these statutes sets
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."
Id.
39. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
40. See Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335 (1959).
41. In order to have jurisdiction over a suit in state court, generally the state court
must be granted jurisdiction by the state legislature. See King, supra note 8, at 1103.
42. King, supra note 8, at 1103.
43. Bernhard, supra note 21, at 93.
44. Id. (quoting Hawai'I Koike v. Board of Water Supply, 352 P.2d 835, 839 (Haw.
1960)).
45. Bernhard, supra note 21, at 93.
46. Id. at 94.
47. Id.
48. These states are: Alabama, California, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, New Hampshire,




forth evidentiary requirements to illustrate actual innocence, they
widely vary in the burden of proof a claimant must establish to
seek redress. The most stringent requirements stipulate that a
claimant receive a full pardon, while more liberal requirements
provide a list of other means through which an individual can
prove actual innocence. Additionally, each of these statutes vary
in terms of levels of compensation. The following is a brief sum-
mary of each of these statutes.
In Alabama, eligibility requirements stipulate that the claimant
establish the following prerequisites: (1) he or she was convicted
and served time in a prison;41 (2) he or she had the conviction ei-
ther vacated or reversed on grounds of innocence or grounds con-
sistent with innocence;" (3) he or she is not currently serving a
term of imprisonment for any other crime;51 (4) he or she did not
serve any part of a prison term in conjunction with the vacated or
reversed conviction with a sentence for a different conviction; 2 (5)
he or she did not receive compensation from the Legislature; and
(6) he or she was not subsequently convicted of a felony crime.54 If
all of these requirements are met, a claimant is limited in his or
her recovery to $50,000 for each full year of confinement and the
pro rata share of any partial year served.55 However, the Commit-
tee on Compensation for Wrongful Incarceration has discretion to
submit a bill to the legislature for any supplemental amounts they
deem necessary for adequate compensation.6
The eligibility requirements in California stipulate the follow-
ing: (1) the claimant must prove either (a) the crime was not
committed at all, or (b) the crime was not committed by him or
her;57 (2) he or she did not intentionally or negligently contribute
to his or her arrest or conviction;" and (3) he or she has obtained
either (a) a judgment of acquittal or discharge, (b) a pardon, or (c)
release from imprisonment.59 If these requirements are met, a
49. ALA. CODE § 29-2-156 (2004).
50. ALA. CODE § 29-2-157 (2004).
51. ALA. CODE § 29-2-161(a) (2004).
52. ALA. CODE § 29-2-161(b) (2004).
53. ALA. CODE § 29-2-161(d) (2004).
54. ALA. CODE § 29-2-161(e) (2004).
55. ALA. CODE § 29-2-159(a) (2004).
56. ALA. CODE § 29-2-159(b) (2004).
57. CAL. PENAL CODE § 4903 (2004).
58. CAL. PENAL CODE § 4903 (2004).
59. CAL. PENAL CODE § 4901 (2004).
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claimant is limited to an amount equal to $100 per day of con-
fmement.6°
Illinois has one of the most stringent requirements, namely that
the claimant be pardoned on grounds of innocence.6' If a claimant
is successful in obtaining the pardon, he or she is limited to an
amount of compensation based on the number of years wrongfully
incarcerated. 62 Specifically, if erroneously imprisoned less than
five years, a claimant is limited to $15,000; if erroneously impris-
oned between five and fourteen years, a claimant is limited to
$30,000; and if erroneously imprisoned more than fourteen years,
a claimant is limited to $35,000.63
The requirements in Maine demand that a claimant prove the
following by clear and convincing evidence: (1) he or she was con-
victed of a criminal offense;' (2) he or she was sentenced to a pe-
riod of incarceration and was actually incarcerated;" (3) he or she
received a full and free pardon;66 and (4) subsequent to a pardon,
he or she was found innocent by the court.6  On the slight chance
that a claimant is able to meet these stipulations, he or she is lim-
ited to compensation in the amount of $300,000.68
The only requirement in Maryland is receipt of a full pardon
stating that the conviction has conclusively been shown to be in
error.69 There is no predetermined amount of damages, as the
level of compensation is set at "actual damages sustained by the
individual," ° including "a reasonable amount for any financial or
other appropriate counseling for the individual."7 There is a lack
of case law discussing the definition of the phrase "reasonable
amounts," as the value of this figure is left to the discretion of the
Board of Public Works.72
New Hampshire does not explicitly outline any requirements
that a claimant must satisfy in order to receive compensation from
60. CAL. PENAL CODE § 4904 (2004).
61. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505 § 8(c) (2004).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. 14 ME. REV. STAT. § 8241(a) (2004).
65. 14 ME. REv. STAT. § 8241(b) (2004).
66. 14 ME. REV. STAT. § 8241(c) (2004).
67. 14 ME. REV. STAT. § 8241(d) (2004).
68. 14 ME. REV. STAT. § 8242 (2004).
69. MD Code § 10-501(b) (2004).





the state; however, the amount of recovery cannot exceed
$20,000."'
The state of New Jersey requires a claimant to establish the fol-
lowing by clear and convincing evidence: (1) he or she was con-
victed of a crime and subsequently sentenced to a term of impris-
onment;74 (2) he or she served this term in whole or in part;" (3) he
or she did not commit the crime for which he or she was con-
victed;76 and (4) he or she did not bring about the conviction by his
or her own conduct.77 Additionally, a claimant will not be entitled
to compensation if (1) he or she is currently serving a term of im-
prisonment for any other crime," or (2) he or she served his or her
sentence for mistaken conviction concurrently with a conviction
for another crime." Damages are limited to reasonable attorney's
fees8" plus the greater of (1) twice the amount of the claimant's
income in the year prior to his or her incarceration, or (2) $20,000
for each year of incarceration.8
In New York, a claimant must meet the following requirements:
(1) he or she was convicted of one or more felonies or misdemean-
ors;812 (2) he or she was subsequently sentenced to a term of im-
prisonment and served all or part of this term;83 (3) he or she ei-
ther (a) was pardoned on grounds of innocence, (b) had the judg-
ment of conviction reversed or vacated, or (c) was found not guilty
at a new trial;84 (4) he or she did not commit any of the acts
charged or his personal acts or omission did not constitute a felony
or misdemeanor;8 and (5) he or she did not bring about the convic-
tion by his or her own conduct.8" There is no cap on the amount of
compensation a claimant is entitled to receive, and the only stipu-
lation is that this amount be fair and reasonable.87
73. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 541-B:14 (2003).
74. N.J. STAT. § 52:4C-3(a) (2004).
75. Id.
76. N.J. STAT. § 52:4C-3(b) (2004).
77. N.J. STAT. § 52:4C-3(c) (2004).
78. N.J. STAT. § 52:4C-6(a) (2004).
79. N.J. STAT. § 52:4C-6(b) (2004).
80. N.J. STAT. § 52:4C-5(b) (2004).
81. N.J. STAT. § 52:4C-5(a) (2004).
82. N.Y. COURT OF CLAIMS LAW § 8-b(3)(a) (2004).
83. Id.
84. N.Y. COURT OF CLAIMS LAW § 8-b(3)(b) (2004).
85. N.Y. COURT OF CLAIMS LAW § 8-b(4)(a) (2004).
86. N.Y. COURT OF CLAIMS LAW § 8-b(5)(d) (2004).
87. N.Y. COURT OF CLAIMS LAW § 8-b(6) (2004).
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North Carolina requires a claimant to have received a full par-
don for his or her conviction, as well as to have served all or a part
of his or her sentence.' Damages are limited to $20,000 per full
year of confinement and the pro rata share of this amount for any
partial year; however, the total amount of compensation cannot
exceed $500,000.89
The requirements in Iowa stipulate the following: (1) the claim-
ant must have been charged with commission of a public offense;9 °
(2) the claimant must not have plead guilty to the charge or to any
lesser included offense;91 (3) the claimant must have been sen-
tenced to a term of incarceration;92 (4) the claimant must have had
his or her conviction vacated, dismissed, or reversed;93 and (5) the
claimant must have been imprisoned solely on the basis of the
conviction that was vacated, dismissed, or reversed.94 Damages
are limited to the following: (1) "amounts paid for restitution for
any fine, surcharge, other penalty or court costs imposed and
paid;"9 (2) reasonable attorney fees and "expenses incurred in
connection with all criminal proceedings and appeals;"96 (3) $50
per day of wrongful incarceration;97 (4) the value of any lost wages,
salary, or other earned income up to $25,000 per year;98 and (5) the
reasonable value of any attorney fees in bringing a claim for com-
pensation.99
Ohio requires a claimant to meet the following requirements:
(1) he or she was charged with violating the criminal code;0 ' (2) he
or she was found guilty, but did not plead guilty to either the
charge or a lesser included offense;01 (3) he or she was sentenced
to a term of imprisonment; °2 (4) his or her conviction was vacated
or dismissed, or reversed on appeal;"3 and (5) either an error in
procedure resulted in release or it was determined by the court
88. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-84 (2004).
89. Id.
90. IOWA CODE § 663A.1(1)(a) (2004).
91. IOWA CODE § 663A.1(1)(b) (2004).
92. IOWA CODE § 663A.1(1)(c) (2004).
93. IOWA CODE § 663A.1(1)(d) (2004).
94. IOWA CODE § 663A.1(1)(e) (2004).
95. IOWA CODE § 663A. 1(6)(a) (2004).
96. Id.
97. IOWA CODE § 663A. 1(6)(b) (2004).
98. IOWA CODE § 663A.1(6)(c) (2004).
99. IOWA CODE § 663A.1(6)(d) (2004).
100. OR. REV. STAT. § 2743.48(A)(1) (2005).
101. OR. REV. STAT. § 2743.48 (A)(2) (2005).
102. OR. REV. STAT. § 2743.48 (A)(3) (2005).
103. OR. REV. STAT. § 2743.48 (A)(4) (2005).
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that either he or she did not commit the act or that the act was not
committed by anyone."' If these requirements are met, a claimant
is limited to receipt of the following amounts: (1) any fine or court
costs imposed and paid; 5 (2) reasonable attorney fees and other
expenses incurred in connection with all associated criminal pro-
ceedings and appeals;06 (3) $40,330 per full year of imprisonment
or the applicable pro rata share;0 7 (4) any loss of wages, salary, or
earned income; 8 and (5) any payments made to the Department
of Rehabilitation for co-payments of services, cost of housing or
feeding, cost of supervision, and cost of any ancillary services. 9
The state of Tennessee requires that a claimant either (1) have
been exonerated, or (2) have received an unconditional pardon on
grounds of innocence."0 A limit on potential damages is set at
$1,000,000.00.'
Texas requires that (1) the claimant serve a sentence in whole
or in part;"' and (2) the claimant have either (a) received a full
pardon on the basis of innocence,' or (b) have been granted relief
on the basis of actual innocence for the crime he or she was sen-
tenced."' Additionally, a claimant is barred from receiving com-
pensation if he or she concurrently served any part of the sentence
for the wrongful conviction with a conviction for another crime.
The amount of damages recoverable is based on the amount of
time an individual was wrongfully imprisoned."6 If the individual
was wrongfully imprisoned less than twenty years, he or she is
entitled to $25,000 per year or its pro rata share."7 If the individ-
ual was wrongfully imprisoned more than twenty years, he or she
is entitled to $500,000.1" However, if the claimant is either (1)
subsequently convicted of a felony, or (2) dies, payments will be
terminated."9
104. OR. REV. STAT. § 2743.48 (A)(5) (2005).
105. OR. REV. STAT. § 2743.48 (E)(2)(a) (2005).
106. Id.
107. OR. REV. STAT. § 2743.48 (E)(2)(b) (2005),
108. OR. REV. STAT. § 2743.48 (E)(2)(c) (2005).
109. OR. REV. STAT. § 2743.48 (E)(2)(d) (2005).
110. TENN. CODE. ANN. § 9-8-108(a)(7) (2004).
111. TENN. CODE. ANN. § 9-8-108(a)(7)(A) (2004).
112. TEX. Cv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 103.001(a)(1) (2004).
113. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 103.001(a)(2)(a) (2004).
114. TEX. Crv. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 103.001(a)(2)(b) (2004).
115. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 103.001(b) (2004).
116. TEX. CIrV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 103.052 (2004).
117. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 103.052(1) (2004).
118. TEX. Crv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 103.052(2) (2004).
119. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 103.154 (2004).
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In West Virginia, a claimant must establish the following by
clear and convincing evidence: (1) he or she was arrested and im-
prisoned for one or more felonies and the charges were dismissed
against him or her when another person was subsequently
charged; 2 ' (2) he or she was convicted and sentenced to a term of
imprisonment and has served all or part of this term;12' and (3)
either (a) he or she received a pardon on grounds of innocence, (b)
his or her judgment of conviction was reversed or vacated, or he or
she was found not guilty at a new trial, or (c) the situation on
which the conviction was based violated either the Constitution of
the United States or the Constitution of West Virginia; 1 2 (4) he or
she did not commit any of the acts charged;1 3 and (5) he or she did
not bring about the conviction by his or her own conduct.2 4 The
amount of compensation is limited to an amount that the court
determines to be fair and reasonable.
Wisconsin requires that (1) the petitioner be innocent of the
crime for which he or she suffered imprisonment, 126 and (2) the
petitioner did not contribute to his or her conviction. '27 Compensa-
tion is capped at a total amount of $25,000, and the petitioner is
limited to $5,000 per year of incarceration or its pro rata share.
2
1
In order for a claimant to receive compensation in the District of
Columbia, the claimant must have been (1) unjustly convicted,
and (2) subsequently imprisoned for a criminal offense. 9 No other
stipulations or limitations are stated.1"0
To bring a claim against the Federal Government, a claimant
must establish the following through either a certificate of the
court or a pardon:w " ' (1)(a) his or her conviction has been reversed
or set aside on grounds that he or she is not guilty, (b) he or she
was found not guilty at a new trial, or (c) he or she received a par-
don; 32 and (2)(a) he or she did not commit any of the acts, deeds,
or omissions charged, and (b) he or she did not bring about his or
120. W. VA. CODE § 14-2-13a(f)(1) (2004).
121. W. VA. CODE § 14-2-13a(f)(2) (2004).
122. W. VA. CODE § 14-2-13a(f)(3) (2004).
123. W. VA. CODE § 14-2-13a(f)(4) (2004).
124. W. VA. CODE § 14-2-13a(f)(5) (2004).
125. W. VA. CODE § 14-2-13a(g) (2004).
126. Wis. STAT. § 775.05(3) (2003).
127. Wis. STAT. § 775.05(4) (2003).
128. Id.
129. D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-421 (2004).
130. Id.
131. 28 U.S.C. § 2513(b) (2005).
132. 28 U.S.C. § 2513(a)(1) (2005).
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her own prosecution by either misconduct or neglect. 3 3 If a claim-
ant successfully makes this showing, the cap placed on amounts
that are recoverable depend on the nature of the individual's sen-
tence. These caps apply as follows: (a) if he or she was incarcer-
ated and unjustly sentenced to death the amount is capped at
"$100,000 for each 12-month period of incarceration," and (b) if he
or she was incarcerated but not sentenced to death the amount is
capped at "$50,000 for each 12-month period of incarceration."34
As the above statutes illustrate, the burdens of proof placed on a
claimant, as well as the applicable level of compensation, vary
considerably from state to state. However, each of these statutes
represents a recognition of the hardships faced by a wrongfully
imprisoned individual, as well as an attempt to redress egregious
wrongs committed.
III. THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
Due to the lack of an enabling statute in Pennsylvania, the only
paths open to an individual victimized by an unjust and wrongful
conviction are: (1) to bring a claim based on tort liability against
either (a) the Commonwealth, or (b) an officer of the Common-
wealth; or (2) to lobby the legislature to pass a private bill to grant
compensation through special legislation. However, the ability to
traverse these avenues is hindered severely by problematic pot-
holes, including but not limited to (1) state immunity extending to
governmental actors, and (2) a lack of success in terms of lobbying
the state legislature to pass private bills.
A. Claims Based on Tort Liability
In Pennsylvania, claims brought by or on behalf of individuals
wrongfully incarcerated have generally been barred by the concept
of "sovereign immunity." This immunity stems from Article I,
Section 11 of the state constitution, which maintains that "suits
may be brought against the Commonwealth in such manner, in
such courts and in such cases as the Legislature may by law di-
rect."'35 It is from this notion that the well-established principle
averring "that the Commonwealth, and its officials and employees
acting within the scope of their duties, shall continue to enjoy sov-
133. 28 U.S.C. § 2513(a)(2) (2005).
134. 28 U.S.C. § 2513(e) (2005).
135. PA. CONST. Art. 1, § 11 (2003).
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ereign and official immunity and remain immune from suit except
as the General Assembly shall specifically waive the immunity"'36
springs.
Immunity for the Commonwealth has only been waived in nine
categories of cases, namely: (1) vehicle liability; (2) medical-
professional liability; (3) care, custody or control of personal prop-
erty; (4) Commonwealth real estate; (5) potholes and other dan-
gerous conditions; (6) care, custody or control of animals; (7) liquor
store sales; (8) National Guard activities; and (9) toxoids and vac-
cines. 37 However, immunity for employees of local agencies have
been waived in actions "for damages on account of an injury
caused by the act of the employee in which it is judicially deter-
mined that the act
... caused the injury and that such act constituted a crime,
actual fraud, actual malice, or willful misconduct." 3 ' Addi-
tionally, immunity of a state agency has been waived for the
above mentioned nine categories; however, liability will only
be imposed if "the injury was caused by the negligent acts [not
including acts of conduct constituting a crime, actual fraud,
actual malice, or willful misconduct] of the local agency or an
employee thereof acting within the scope of his office or du-
ties.' 39
1. Suits Against the Commonwealth or a State Agency
As a result of the above mentioned requirements for bringing
suit against the Commonwealth or a state agency, such tort-based
actions for wrongfully incarcerated individuals have not been suc-
cessful. For instance, in Jones v. Packel,14° the Commonwealth
Court of Pennsylvania refused to disregard the concept of sover-
eign immunity in an action for false imprisonment."' The plain-
136. 1 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2310 (2004). See also Wesley v. Dombrowski, No. 03-4137, 2004
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11938, *25 (E.D. Pa. 2004); Dennsion v. Pa. Dep't of Corr., 268 F. Supp.
2d 387, 405 (M.D. Pa. 2003).
137. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8522 (2004); see also Wesley, No. 03-4137, 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11938 at *26 n.3. Interestingly, should a litigant's claim fit into one of these catego-
ries, damages are capped at $250,000 for a single plaintiff, or $1,000,000 for multiple plain-
tiffs, and are only recoverable for (1) "past and future loss of earnings and earning capac-
ity," (2) pain and suffering," (3) medical and dental expenses," (4) loss of consortium, and (5)
property loss. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8528(c) (2004).
138. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8550 (2004).
139. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8542(a)(2) (2004).
140. Jones v. Packel, 342 A.2d 434 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975).
141. Jones, 342 N2d at 436-37.
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tiff, a wrongfully incarcerated individual who spent nineteen and
one half years in jail, requested the Court to either strike-down
sovereign immunity or to find that the legislature waived this con-
cept for individuals in his position.1 4 2 In addressing these conten-
tions, the Court reaffirmed the idea that "discretion to effectuate
change [in sovereign immunity] lies not with the judiciary, but
with the legislature,"' and that in order to constitute a waiver,
the legislature explicitly must state that it consents to suit
through appropriate legislation.14
2. Suits Against Employees of Local Agencies
As aforementioned, immunity for employees of local agencies
has been waived when the employee has caused injury and the
employee's actions have constituted a crime, actual fraud, actual
malice, or willful misconduct.' In order to prove "actual malice,"
a plaintiff must show that the defendant intentionally committed
"a wrongful act without lawful or justifiable excuse. ", 4' To prove
"willful misconduct," a plaintiff must illustrate "conduct whereby
the actor desired to bring about the result that followed or at least
was aware that it was substantially certain to follow, so that such
desire can be implied."'47 And, to prove "actual fraud," a plaintiff
must demonstrate "(1) misrepresentation of material fact, (2) sci-
enter, (3) intention by the maker to induce the recipient to act, (4)
justifiable reliance by the recipient upon the misrepresentation,
and (5) damage to the recipient as a proximate result."'48
In Ferber v. City of Philadelphia,"' a wrongfully incarcerated
individual brought suit against various police officers, alleging
"malicious prosecution, civil conspiracy, abuse of process, inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress and loss of consortium."' 50
The plaintiff had been wrongfully incarcerated for three and a half
years after being convicted and sentenced to death for two mur-
142. Id. The plaintiff argued that the legislature had waived immunity in suits for com-
pensation based on false imprisonment due to periodic allocation of funds from the treasury
for individuals in his position. Id.
143. Id. at 436.
144. Id. at 437.
145. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8550 (2004).
146. Anders v. Zonning Hearing Board, 19 Pa. D. & C. 4th 77, 82 (1992).
147. Robbins v. Cumberland County Childrens & Youth Services, 802 A.2d 1239, 1252
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002).
148. Kuehner v. Parsons, 527 A.2d 627, 629 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1987).
149. Ferber v. City of Philadelphia, 661 A.2d 470 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1995).
150. Ferber, 661 A.2d at 472.
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ders. 151 At trial, the jury concluded that the "police officers con-
spired to convict Ferber by misusing their positions as police offi-
cers,"'52 by fabricating a tip from an informant, manipulating wit-
nesses, misrepresenting a statement by a witness as a positive
identification, suborning perjury from a prisoner regarding a con-
fession, and misrepresenting a polygraph test.
153
On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the plaintiff sought to
have the City of Philadelphia found liable for the misconduct of its
employees.' While the Court found that the City was unable to
waive immunity, it reaffirmed in dictum that the defendant police
officers were not immune from suit, as their actions constituted
criminal conduct and willful misconduct. 55
Therefore, while a wrongfully incarcerated individual is pre-
cluded from recovering damages from the Commonwealth directly,
he or she may be able to receive compensation from an employee
of the Commonwealth. Unfortunately in terms of recovery, the
employee most likely will have relatively "shallow pockets," and
will not be entitled to indemnification from the agency for which
he or she is employed unless he or she was acting in good faith
within the course and scope of his or her duties.'
B. Private Bills/Moral Claims
Since 1969, twenty-nine private acts advocating for "[appropria-
tions] to the Office of the Attorney General for the payment of cer-
tain moral claims against the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania"57
151. Id.
152. Id. at 473.
153. Id. at 472-73.
154. Id. at 475.
155. Ferber, 661 A.2d at 475-76.
156. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8548(a) (2004).
157. (1) H.B. 2530 P.N. 3515 (Pa. 2000)(died in committee); (2) H.B. 327 P.N. 330 (Pa.
1995)(died in committee); (3) S.B. 1167 P.N 1583 (Pa. 1995)(died in committee); (4) S.B.
1167 P.N 1363 (Pa. 1995)(died in committee); (5) H.B. 2367 P.N. 3224 (Pa. 1990)(died in
committee); (6) H.B. 398 P.N. 428 (Pa. 1985)(died in committee); (7) H.B. 412 P.N. 466 (Pa.
1985)(died in committee); (8) H.B. 1243 P.N. 1482 (Pa. 1985)(died in committee); (9) H.B.
403 P.N. 453 (Pa. 1983)(died in committee); (10) H.B. 731 P.N. 814 (Pa. 1983)(died in com-
mittee); (11) H.B. 2225 P.N. 2872 (Pa. 1982)(died in committee); (12) H.B. 2713 P.N. 3656
(Pa. 1982)(died in committee); (13) H.B. 2365 P.N. 3058 (Pa. 1980)(died in committee); (14)
H.B. 1444 P.N. 1716 (Pa. 1977) (died in committee); (15) H.B. 1082 P.N 2709 (Pa.
1975)(died in committee); (16) H.B. 1082 P.N 1615 (Pa. 1975)(died in committee); (17) H.B.
1082 P.N. 1243 (Pa. 1975)(died in committee); (18) H.B. 1596 P.N. 1949 (Pa. 1975)(died in
committee); (19) H.B. 2499 P.N. 3475 (Pa. 1974)(died in committee); (20) H.B. 898 P.N.
1060 (Pa. 1973)(died in committee); (21) H.B. 161 P.N. 184 (Pa. 1973)(died in committee);
(22) H.B. 262 P.N. 292 (Pa. 1973)(died in committee); (23) H.B. 338 P.N. 376 (Pa. 1973)(died
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have died in committee.' These twenty-nine separate acts repre-
sent legislation proposed on behalf of only ten wrongfully impris-
oned individuals. 159
Specifically, each of these proposed acts have called for the ap-
propriation of certain sums of money to be paid for "an alleged
commission of a crime in violation of the penal laws of this Com-
monwealth which later discovered evidence has proven such per-
son to be innocent."8 ' Additionally, all of the appropriations were
for "loss due to personal injury or sickness, including but not lim-
ited to loss of reputation, good will, savings, attorney fees and
other fees in defense against the prosecution of aforesaid crimes..
* , other physical or mental deprivation... , [and] deprivation of
personal and civil rights."6 '
Proposed payments have ranged from $450,000 for six years of
wrongful imprisonment... to a mere $24,000 for twenty-six years of
wrongful imprisonment.'63 Roughly, an estimate of the proposed
payments average approximately $18,000 of compensation per
year of wrongful containment,"M with about half of the twenty-nine
in committee); (24) H.B. 1877 P.N 3129 (Pa. 1972)(died in committee); (25) H.B. 1877 P.N.
2376 (Pa. 1972)(died in committee); (26) H.B. 2164 P.N. 2860 (Pa. 1972)(died in committee);
(27) H.B. 2491 P.N. 3342 (Pa. 1972)(died in committee); (28) S.B. 697 P.N. 939 (Pa.
1971)(died in committee); and (29) S.B. 697 P.N. 742 (Pa. 1971)(died in committee).
158. Id.
159. The following acts were proposed for the following individuals: (1) Jerry Pacek -
H.B. 2530 P.N. 3515 (Pa. 2000); (2) Hayden C. Jones - H.B. 327 P.N. 330 (Pa. 1995), S.B.
1167 P.N. 1583 (Pa. 1995), S.B. 1167 P.N. 1363 (Pa. 1995), H.B. 1596 P.N. 1949 (Pa. 1975),
H.B. 2499 P.N. 3475 (Pa. 1974), H.B. 161 P.N. 184 (Pa. 1973), H.B. 2164 P.N. 2860 (Pa.
1992); (3) Unspecified Individual - H.B. 2367 P.N. 3224 (Pa. 1990), H.B. 398 P.N. 428 (Pa.
1985), H.B. 403 P.N. 453 (Pa. 1983), H.B. 2225 P.N. 2872 (Pa. 1982); (4) Unspecified Indi-
vidual - H.B. 412 P.N. 466 (Pa. 1985), H.B. 1243 P.N. 1482 (Pa. 1985), H.B. 731 P.N. 814
(Pa. 1983), H.B. 2713 P.N. 3656 (Pa. 1982); (5) Unspecified Individual - H.B. 2365 P.N.
3058 (Pa. 1980); (6) Unspecified Individual -H.B. 1444 P.N. 1716 (Pa. 1977) (7) Unspecified
Individual - H.B. 1082 P.N. 2709 (Pa. 1975), H.B. 1082 P.N. 1615 (Pa. 1975), H.B. 1082
P.N. 1243 (Pa. 1975), H.B. 898 P.N. 1060 (Pa. 1973); (8) Unspecified Individual - H.B. 262
P.N. 292 (Pa. 1973); (9) Unspecified Individual -H.B. 338 P.N. 376 (Pa. 1973), H.B. 1877
P.N. 3219 (Pa. 1972), H.B. 1877 P.N. 2376 (Pa. 1972); (10) Unspecified Individual - S.B. 697
P.N. 939 (Pa. 1971), S.B. 697 P.N. 742 (Pa. 1971).
160. See supra note 157 for a list of the relevant proposed acts.
161. See supra note 157 for a list of the relevant proposed acts.
162. H.B. 412 P.N. 466 (Pa. 1985), H.B. 1243 P.N. 1482 (Pa. 1985), H.B. 731 P.N. 814
(Pa. 1983), and H.B. 2713 P.N. 3656 (Pa. 1982).
163. H.B. 1082 P.N. 1615 (Pa. 1975). This amount did not include $16,000 allocated to
damages for the loss of four fingers. Id. Previously, legislation proposed on behalf of this
individual would have allocated $40,000 for the combined damages of wrongful imprison-
ment and the loss of his fingers. H.B. 1082 P.N. 1243 (Pa. 1975), H.B. 2499 P.N. 3475 (Pa.
1974). Subsequent legislation proposed allocation of $50,000 for these combined damages.
H.B. 1082 P.N. 2709 (Pa. 1975).
164. The following amounts have been proposed for the following number of years of
wrongful imprisonment: (1) $200,000/10 years, (2) $325,000/19.5 years, (3) $60,000/5 years,
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proposed acts offering less than $10,000 per year of confinement.
65
The highest proposed average appropriation per year of confine-
ment was $75,000 per year for 6 years,'66 with $20,000 per year for
10 years being the second highest proposed appropriation.
7
Ironically, in 1975, proposed H.B. 1082 P.N. 2709 specifically allo-
cated $16,000 to the loss of an individual's four fingers. As can
be seen through analysis of these figures, the proposed amounts
have been random and any hope of receiving compensation has
been slim.
C. Proposed Alternative Routes
Due to inherent problems in bringing a tort-based suit against
either the Commonwealth or an official, as well as the difficulties
in lobbying to have a private bill passed for a moral claim, at least
nine bills have been proposed to provide alternative routes to
compensation for wrongfully incarcerated individuals in Pennsyl-
vania. However, much like the ill-fated private bills mentioned
above, all of these propositions have died in committee.'69 In
summary, they can be categorized into two distinct groups: (1)
(4) $450,000/6 years, (5) $100,000/34 years, (6) $75,000/35 years, (7) $50,000/26 years, (8)
$24,000/26 years, (9) $40,000/6 years, (10) $133,00/19 years, (11) $186,200/19 years,
(12)$100,000/11 years, (13)$40,000/3 years, and (14)$75,000/13 years. See supra note 155
for a list of the relevant proposed acts.
165. (1) H.B. 2365 P.N. 3058 (Pa. 1980) - approximately $2,900 per year for 34 years of
confinement; (2) H.B. 1444 P.N. 1716 (Pa. 1977) - approximately $2,100/year for 35 years of
confinement; (3) H.B. 1082 P.N. 2709 (Pa. 1975) - approximately $2,000/year for 26 years of
confinement; (4) H.B. 1082 P.N. 1615 (Pa. 1975) - approximately $900/year for 26 years of
confinement; (5) H.B. 1082 P.N. 1243 (Pa. 1975) and H.B. 898 P.N. 1060 (Pa. 1973) - ap-
proximately $1,500/year for 26 years of confinement; (6) H.B. 1596 P.N. 1949 (Pa. 1975) -
approximately $7,000/year for 19 years of confinement; (7) H.B. 2499 P.N. 3475 (Pa. 1974)
and H.B. 161 P.N. 184 (Pa. 1973) - approximately $9,800/year for 19 years of confinement;
(8) H.B. 262 P.N. 292 (Pa. 1973) and H.B. 2491 P.N. 3342 (Pa. 1972) - approximately
$9,000/year for 11 years of confinement; (9) S.B. 697 P.N. 939 (Pa. 1971) and S.B. 967 P.N.
742 (Pa. 1971) - approximately $5,700/year for 13 years of confinement.
166. H.B. 412 P.N. 466 (Pa. 1985), H.B. 1243 P.N. 1482 (Pa. 1985), H.B. 731 P.N. 814
(Pa. 1983), and H.B. 2713 P.N. 3656 (Pa. 1982).
167. H.B. 2530 P.N. 3515 (Pa. 2000). Other averages per year have been: (1) H.B. 327
P.N. 330 (Pa. 1995), S.B. 1167 P.N. 1583 (Pa. 1995), S.B. 1167 P.N. 136 (Pa. 1995) - ap-
proximately $17,000/year for 19.5 years confinement; (2) H.B. 2367 P.N. 322 (Pa. 1990),
H.B. 398 P.N. 428 (Pa. 1985), H.B. 403 P.N. 453 (Pa. 1983) and H.B. 2225 P.N. 2872 (Pa.
1982) - approximately $12,000/year for 5 years confinement; and (3) H.B. 338 P.N. 376 (Pa.
1973), H.B. 1877 P.N. 3219 (Pa. 1972), and H.B. 1877 P.N. 2376 (Pa. 1972) - approximately
$13,000/year for 3 years confinement.
168. H.B. 1082 P.N. 2709 (Pa. 1975).
169. H.B. 1281 P.N. 1591 (Pa. 2003), H.B. 2413 P.N. 3439 (Pa. 1984), S.B. 267 P.N. 269
(Pa. 1977), S.B. 93 P.N. 93 (Pa. 1977), S.B. 1712 P.N. 2214 (Pa. 1976), S.B. 1361 P.N. 1657
(Pa. 1976), S.B. 3 P.N. 3 (Pa. 1973), H.B. 529 P.N. 592 (Pa. 1973), and S.B. 1721 P.N. 2197
(Pa. 1972).
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proposed bills advocating for the creation of a recommendation
committee7 ° and (2) proposed bills advocating for the right of a
wrongfully incarcerated individual to bring a claim for damages
against the state.1
71
1. Proposed Creation of a Recommendation Committee
Since 1972, eight bills have been proposed for the creation of a
review committee to which moral claims of wrongfully imprisoned
individuals could be submitted.7 2 These bills would have created
many advantages to the current system of lobbying for appropria-
tions as they entitled one to a reduction in time for potential com-
pensation, required that claims for compensation be backed by
evidence instead of mere impassioned speech, and eliminated the
need to lobby for appropriations. The first set of these proposed
bills dealt with the creation of a "State Board of Moral Claims Ex-
aminers. The second dealt with the creation of a "Common-
wealth Moral Claims Board," 74 and the third dealt with notifica-
tion to the Office of General Council.'
7'
a. State Board of Moral Claims Examiners
The proposed acts providing for the creation of a State Board of
Moral Claims Examiners would have enlisted this board to "re-
view all applications for the payment of moral claims arising
against the Commonwealth due to wrongful imprisonment."76
The board was to consist of three individuals, one of whom was to
be an attorney appointed by the Governor after consent by two-
thirds of the Senate.7 7 It was proposed that these three individu-
als would initially serve staggering terms of two years, four years,
and six years, with each of their predecessors serving six year
170. H.B. 2413 P.N. 3439 (Pa. 1984), S.B. 267 P.N. 269 (Pa. 1977), S.B. 93 P.N. 93 (Pa.
1977), S.B. 1712 P.N. 2214 (Pa. 1976), S.B. 1361 P.N. 1657 (Pa. 1976), S.B. 3 P.N. 3 (Pa.
1973), H.B. 529 P.N. 592 (Pa. 1973), and S.B. 1721 P.N. 2197 (Pa. 1972).
171. H.B. 1281 P.N. 1591 (Pa. 2003).
172. See supra note 170.
173. S.B. 1721 P.N. 2197 (Pa. 1972), H.B. 529 P.N. 592 (Pa. 1973), S.B. 3 P.N. 3 (Pa.
1973), S.B. 1361 P.N. 1657 (Pa. 1976), and S.B. 93 P.N. 93 (Pa. 1977).
174. S.B. 1712 P.N. 2214 (Pa. 1976) and S.B. 267 P.N. 269 Pa. 1977).
175. H.B. 2413 P.N. 3439 (Pa. 1984).
176. S.B. 1721(1)(b) P.N. 2197 (Pa. 1972), H.B. 529(1)(b) P.N. 592 (Pa. 1973), S.B. 3(1)(b)
P.N. 3 (Pa. 1973), S.B. 1361(1)(b) P.N. 1657 (Pa. 1976), and S.B. 93(1)(b) P.N. 93 (Pa. 1977).
177. S.B. 1721(1)(a) P.N. 2197 (Pa. 1972), H.B. 529(1)(a) P.N. 592 (Pa. 1973), S.B.
3(1)(a) P.N. 3 (Pa. 1973), S.B. 1361(1)(a) P.N. 1657 (Pa. 1976), and S.B. 93(1)(a) P.N. 93 (Pa.
1977).
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terms." 8 Additionally, all actions would have required the pres-
ence of a quorum consisting of at least two individuals. 79
Specifically, the board was to be set up to "investigate the verac-
ity of the merits of each claim."8 ° The only burden to be placed
upon a wrongfully incarcerated individual was to present "clear
supportive evidence establishing the fact that [he or she] was not
guilty of the offense charged and was imprisoned wrongfully of an
offense which [he or she] had not committed."'' After investiga-
tion of each claim by the board, the board's findings were to be
forwarded to the Attorney General.'82 Following careful review of
the evidence presented to the board, the Attorney General was to
have discretion to either dismiss the claim or to "prepare suitable
legislation for introduction to the General Assembly allocating
such sums from the budget of the Department of Justice."8 ' The
power to make the final determination regarding compensation
was allocated to the legislature.'
b. Commonwealth Moral Claims Board
The duty of the proposed Commonwealth Moral Claims Board,
much like the duty of the proposed Board of Moral Claims Exam-
iners, was to examine "all claims against the Commonwealth on
behalf of released inmates of State penal institutions who have
been unjustly or falsely incarcerated." 5 However, this proposed
board was to be given the additional duty of hearing claims
against the Commonwealth brought on behalf of inmates alleging
injury or death "as a result of aggravated assault and battery,
criminal homicide or involuntary deviate sexual intercourse ...
and as the result of the negligence of the Commonwealth or its
employees in the performance of its duty to protect prisoners from
such abuse." 6
Unlike the proposed Board of Moral Claims Examiners, the
Commonwealth Moral Claims Board was to consist of three indi-
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. S.B. 1721(1)(b) P.N. 2197 (Pa. 1972), H.B. 529(1)(b) P.N. 592 (Pa. 1973), S.B. 3(1)(b)





185. S.B. 1712(2)(a)(2) P.N. 2214 (Pa. 1976) and S.B. 267(2)(a)(2) P.N. 269 (Pa. 1977).
186. S.B. 1712(2)(a)(1) P.N. 2214 (Pa. 1976) and S.B. 267(2)(a)(1) P.N. 269 (Pa. 1977).
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viduals, "all of whom [had to be] admitted to the practice of law by
the Supreme Court of the Commonwealth and no more than two of
whom [would have belonged] to the same political party,"8 7 ap-
pointed by the Governor with the consent of a majority of the Sen-
ate. 88 The terms of appointment mirrored the terms of the Board
of Moral Claims Examiners, with one member initially serving
two years, another serving four years, and the third serving six
years.189 Each of the three member's successors would serve six
year terms.9 '
The proposed Commonwealth Moral Claims Board was to be
managed more judicially and was to possess more powers than the
proposed Board of Moral Claims Examiners. For instance, the
Commonwealth Moral Claims Board would be endowed with the
power to (1) "administer oaths or affirmations, examine any per-
son under oath or affirmation and issue subpoenas requiring the
attendance and giving of testimony and witness and require the
production of any books, papers, documentaries, or other evi-
dence;" 9' (2) "to take or cause to be taken affidavits or dispositions
within or without the State;""2 (3) "direct medical examinations of
victims;"'93 (4) "hear and determine all claims filed with the board.
. . and to reinvestigate or reopen cases as . . .deem[ed] neces-
sary;""'94 (5) "request from any State institution, its superintendent,
or employees, such assistance and data as [would] enable [it] to
carry out its functions and duties;"19" ' and (6) "adopt, promulgate,
amend and rescind suitable rules and regulations . . . including
rules for the approval of attorney's fees for representation before
the board or before the Commonwealth Court upon judicial re-
view.-' 96
Each "hearing" would not require the presence of a quorum; in-
stead, a single board member would have the power to examine a
potential claim individually.'97 This individual member was given
the duty to "make a recommendation to the entire board either




191. S.B. 1712(3)(c) P.N. 2214 (Pa. 1976) and S.B. 267(3)(c) P.N. 269 (Pa. 1977).
192. S.B. 1712(3)(d) P.N. 2214 (Pa. 1976) and S.B. 267(3)(d) P.N. 269 (Pa. 1977).
193. S.B. 1712(3)(e) P.N. 2214 (Pa. 1976) and S.B. 267(3)(e) P.N. 269 (Pa. 1977).
194. S.B. 1712(3)(f) P.N. 2214 (Pa. 1976) and S.B. 267(3)(f) P.N. 269 (Pa. 1977).
195. S.B. 1712(3)(g) P.N. 2214 (Pa. 1976) and S.B. 267(3)(g) P.N. 269 (Pa. 1977).
196. S.B. 1712(3)(h) P.N. 2214 (Pa. 1976) and S.B. 267(3)(h) P.N. 269 (Pa. 1977).
197. S.B. 1712(5) P.N. 2214 (Pa. 1976) and S.B. 267(5) P.N. 269 (Pa. 1977).
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granting an award or denying the claim." 198 Determination of the
compensation question was to be determined by a majority of the
board through a voting process.'99 Interestingly, it was proposed
that the Attorney General be limited in his or her discretion over
the matter to merely having the ability to appeal a decision to
compensate to the Commonwealth Court within 30 days of the
board's decision. °
The only action that a wrongfully incarcerated individual had to
take was to file a claim in writing with the executive secretary of
the board within one year after his or her release.20 ' Unfortu-
nately, awards given by the board would have been limited to
$10,000 per year of unjust imprisonment. 2
c. Proposed Wrongful Imprisonment Review Act
After the filing of a claim, the Office of General Council would
be permitted 90 days to "hold hearings, review evidence received
and prepare a formal recommendation for legislative action."2
After careful review, "a recommendation for legislation action to
compensate the wronged party [would have been] filed .. .with
the representative and senator of the legislative district in which
the wronged party lives or with the Majority Leader of the Cham-
ber if the wronged party lives outside [the] Commonwealth."'
04
Final determination of appropriations for compensation would
then be made by the legislature.' 5
2. Proposed Creation of a Claim for Damages
In 2003, legislation was introduced to allow "any person incar-
cerated for one or more felonies or misdemeanors against the
Commonwealth that the person did not commit... [to] file a claim
for damages against the Commonwealth."" 6 The intent of the bill
was to provide "an available avenue of redress over and above the
existing tort remedies to seek compensation for damages." 7
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. S.B. 1712(6) P.N. 2214 (Pa. 1976) and S.B. 267(6) P.N. 269 (Pa. 1977).
201. S.B. 1712(4)(a)-(c) P.N. 2214 (Pa. 1976) and S.B. 267(4)(a)-(c) P.N. 269 (Pa. 1977).
202. S.B. 1712(7)(b) P.N. 2214 (Pa. 1976) and S.B. 267(7)(b) P.N. 269 (Pa. 1977).
203. H.B. 2413(3)(a) P.N. 3439 (Pa. 1984).
204. H.B. 2413(3)(b) P.N. 3439 (Pa. 1984).
205. H.B. 2413(3)(c) P.N. 3439 (Pa. 1984).
206. H.B. 1281(b) P.N. 1591 (Pa. 2003).
207. H.B. 1281(a)(1) P.N. 1591 (Pa. 2003).
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The proposed bill placed a burden on the allegedly wrongfully
convicted individual to show the following four requirements by
clear and compelling evidence:
(1) the claimant was convicted of or was persuaded to plead
guilty, no contest or nolo contendere to one or more criminal
offenses against the Commonwealth and subsequently sen-
tenced to a term of imprisonment and has served all or any
part of the sentence;
(2) (i)the claimant was pardoned upon the ground of inno-
cence of the crime or crimes for which the claimant was sen-
tenced and which are the grounds for the complaint; or
(ii) the claimant's judgment of conviction was reversed or va-
cated, or his plea of guilty, no contest or nolo contendere was
withdrawn by leave of court, and the indictment or informa-
tion dismissed or, if a new trial was ordered, either the claim-
ant was found not guilty at the new trial or was not retried
and the indictment or information dismissed; provided that
the count or counts dismissed were the sole basis for the im-
prisonment complained of;
(3) the claim is not time-barred under subsection (h); and
(4) the claimant was not incarcerated for any reason at the
time of presenting the claim."8
Upon meeting this burden, the claimant's recovery would be
limited to the greater of the following: (1) a sum of money per day
of incarceration equivalent to the highest amount of per diem pay
a member of the General Assembly would have been entitled to
receive that day, or (2) the claimant's actual salary or wage loss
for the period of incarceration. 9 Additionally, the statute of limi-
tations would begin to run two years from either the date of par-
don or the date of dismissal by the Court.210
IV. CONCLUSION
While Pennsylvania has attempted to take the necessary steps
towards addressing the problem of a lack of compensation for er-
208. H.B. 1281(c) P.N. 1591 (Pa. 2003).
209. H.B. 1281(e) P.N. 1591 (Pa. 2003).
210. H.B. 1281(h) P.N. 1591 (Pa. 2003).
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roneously convicted individuals, compared to other states it is far
behind in terms of reform. Denial of recognition for damages
based on these egregious societal wrongs, as well as refusal to
waive sovereign immunity in these particular cases, have put
Pennsylvania years (if not decades) behind more progressive
states. In order to rectify this injustice, it is essential for Pennsyl-
vania to enact an enabling statute, or at the very least to waive
sovereign immunity for cases of such deplorable harm.
Christine L. Zaremski
